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any data collection efforts in the social and clinical sciences
rely on surveys. Psychologists and marketing and survey
experts have long held that surveying a subject can draw attention to risks or choices with ordinarily little salience and thereby
induce changes in subsequent behavior (1, 2), but conclusive
evidence on this question from which a causal relationship can be
clearly established has been limited. We provide evidence from
a variety of settings that the act of being surveyed can affect
behavior and confound estimates of parameters that initially
motivated the data collection.
“Survey” or “interview” effects may occur even when the survey
does not ask speciﬁcally about intent to engage in the behavior of
interest or provide new information, and even when subjects do
not know that their later behavior is being observed by researchers. Hence survey effects are conceptually distinct from, but
closely related to, “question–behavior” (i.e., mere measurement
or self-prophecy) and Hawthorne effects. Question–behavior
effects arise when behavior changes as a result of asking subjects
for intentions or predictions regarding future behavior effects (3–
6). Hawthorne effects occur when behavior changes as a result of
a subject responding to being treated and observed, as part of an
experiment (7). These effects are also related to “push polling”
and other efforts to manipulate subject behavior by posing hypothetical questions (8).
We describe results from ﬁve different ﬁeld experiments, in
four developing countries, on whether being surveyed affects
subsequent behavior. The ﬁrst experiment randomizes the frequency of surveys on health behavior and diarrhea incidence, in
a context in which other water quality interventions are also
randomly provided. More-frequent surveying leads to lower
reported child diarrhea and cleaner water (as measured by the
presence of detectable chlorine in household drinking water).
We posit that frequent surveying serves as a reminder to invest in
water puriﬁcation, although because subjects know they are bewww.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1000776108

ing observed it may also (or instead) be the case that subjects in
the frequent-surveying condition experience more intense Hawthorne effects.
Frequent surveying also signiﬁcantly affects the parameter estimate of the treatment effect of a source water quality intervention.
An outcome measurement strategy that relied exclusively on frequent surveying would have led to the erroneous conclusion that
the source water quality intervention was ineffective. This result
suggests that much of the existing evidence on the effects of various
environmental health interventions on diarrhea may be biased,
because high-frequency measurement of health outcomes is the
standard approach used in the epidemiology literature (9, 10).
The remaining four studies use a three-stage design: ﬁrst
a survey ﬁrm attempts to complete a survey on a random subset
of the full sample, then a microﬁnance institution offers a medical insurance or loan product to the full sample, and last, takeup data are collected from administrative records. Hawthorne
effects are unlikely here because a subject’s take-up decision is
not observed by the surveyor, nor do subjects know that their
take-up is observed subsequently by researchers.
Despite the absence of Hawthorne effects, we still ﬁnd that
being surveyed signiﬁcantly increases take-up in the two medical
insurance experiments. However, in contrast to the water quality
experiment, we ﬁnd that being surveyed does not change estimates of another treatment effect parameter (in this case, the
price elasticity of demand for insurance in experiment 2); nor do
we ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effects of being surveyed on subsequent
loan take-up in the two microloan experiments.
We speculate that survey effects arise in some settings but not
others because some subjects typically ignore certain elements in
their choice or consideration set, instead focusing on more
pressing, tempting, and hence salient claims on resources (e.g.,
those that can be satisﬁed by borrowing or that are salient). Ignored elements may include health-promoting behaviors (e.g.,
water puriﬁcation tasks), certain risks (e.g., accidents), and related
products (e.g., insurance) (11). A survey makes neglected needs or
opportunities more salient and spurs a more active decision (1).
The potential for asking questions that affect subsequent behavior has substantive, methodological, and ethical implications
for the social and medical sciences.
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Does completing a household survey change the later behavior of
those surveyed? In three ﬁeld studies of health and two of microlending, we randomly assigned subjects to be surveyed about health
and/or household ﬁnances and then measured subsequent use of
a related product with data that does not rely on subjects’ selfreports. In the three health experiments, we ﬁnd that being surveyed increases use of water treatment products and take-up of
medical insurance. Frequent surveys on reported diarrhea also led
to biased estimates of the impact of improved source water quality.
In two microlending studies, we do not ﬁnd an effect of being surveyed on borrowing behavior. The results suggest that limited attention could play an important but context-dependent role in
consumer choice, with the implication that researchers should reconsider whether, how, and how much to survey their subjects.
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Substantively, survey effects point to the importance of limited
attention in individual cognition, and manipulation thereof, in
important decisions such as whether to make preventative health
investments or buy insurance. A basic assumption of standard
economic models may not hold: individuals may not consider
important options in their choice set unless (subtly) prompted to
do so, by a survey or some other external stimulus (12).
Methodologically, our ﬁndings suggest that survey effects can
bias parameter estimates (e.g., estimates of other treatment
effects). Consequently it may be preferable in some contexts to do
infrequent measurement of outcomes in a large sample rather
than frequent surveying of a small sample (see our experiment 1).
It may be preferable in other contexts to forgo or circumscribe
a baseline survey that would typically be used to estimate heterogeneous treatment effects (see our experiments 2–5).
Ethically, survey effects raise concerns that researchers or
ﬁrms may inadvertently or deliberately manipulate the later behavior of subjects, with potentially deleterious effects (13, 14).
Our design is unique in how it combines several key features
(the references in this paragraph highlight some prior studies
using a subset of these features). First, the survey questions do
not involve intentions or prediction measurement; that is, our
questions are less directly related to subsequent behaviors of
interest than in most studies of how surveying affects behavior
(15, 16). Second, the relevant survey questions are only a small
fraction of a larger survey (17). Third, we measure subsequent
behavior using administrative data (on product take-up) or other
objective measures (e.g., chlorine tests) rather than relying solely
on respondent self-reports (15, 18–21). Fourth, we investigate
whether survey effects dissipate or intensify over time (15, 19).
Fifth, we look at the effects of being surveyed more or less frequently (7, 17). Sixth, in two of our studies, the survey effect
design is laid over randomized program interventions (source
water quality improvement through spring protection in experiment 1, and insurance pricing in experiment 2), enabling us to
estimate whether survey effects bias estimates of the program
treatment effects [7, 22 (p 24)]. Seventh, in three of our ﬁve
studies (all except experiments 1 and 5), there is no clear link
between the survey and the subsequent product offer or behavior
of interest, and our subjects plausibly do not even know they are
being observed by a third party on an ongoing basis.
Results
Experiment 1: Point-of-Use Home Water Treatment Take-Up in Kenya.

This experiment examines the effect of the frequency of surveying
about health status on the later use of WaterGuard, a chlorine
solution used to disinfect home drinking water. WaterGuard is
marketed widely by Population Services International in Kenya.
The cost of a month’s supply is 20 Kenyan Shillings (or approxi-

mately $0.30 [US]), or roughly one quarter of the daily wage for
agricultural labor in the local area ($1.26).
This experiment also measures the effect of varying the frequency of survey contact on estimates of a treatment effect of
primary interest: the effect of improved source water quality on
diarrhea incidence.
The sample for this experiment is composed of 330 households
in rural western Kenya who were randomly selected from
a frame of 1,500 households involved in a larger randomized
evaluation of spring protection and WaterGuard use (23). Of
these, 170 households were randomly assigned to be surveyed
about health status biweekly [to accord with common practice in
surveys of child diarrhea in epidemiology (9, 10)] for 18 2-wk
rounds beginning in May 2007, although there was a 4-mo gap
between rounds 15 and 16 owing to the postelection violence in
early 2008. A ﬁnal survey (round 19) was conducted 7 mo later in
December 2008. The remaining 160 households were randomly
selected to get the same survey just three times, or every 6 mo,
during the same period: in biweekly survey rounds 9 (September
2007), 16 (April 2008), and 19 (December 2008). More than 97%
of both the biweekly and low-frequency groups completed at
least one of their survey rounds; 90% of the biweekly group
completed at least 17 of the 19 surveys, and 90% of the lowfrequency group completed at least 2 of the 3 surveys. Dataset S1
(panel 1) presents some descriptive statistics.
Questions on chlorine treatment constituted a small fraction
(three questions) of the 20- to 30-min survey (Dataset S2), but
the rest of the survey design in this experiment is such that
subjects knew that their behavior was of some interest to the
surveyors. Health and diarrhea questions constituted much of
the surveys. When a respondent reported that the household’s
drinking water supply had been treated with chlorine, a DPD (Ndimethyl-p-phenylenediamine) test was conducted for total
chlorine in the water stored in the household using a Hach
Pocket Colorimeter II. Thus subjects knew their WaterGuard
use was being observed in a way that could lead to a Hawthorne
effect (from being observed more frequently) as well as a “survey” effect (from being surveyed more frequently).
Table 1, columns 1–4, shows that more-frequent survey visits
led to lower reports of child diarrhea and to more chlorine
(WaterGuard) presence in stored home drinking water. We focus
on outcomes in rounds 9, 16, and 19 because in those rounds both
the biweekly surveys and the low-frequency surveys were conducted. The survey completion rate was 90% in round 9 and 95%
in rounds 16 and 19. Columns 1 and 2 show decreases in child
diarrhea prevalence (as reported by mothers or other care-givers)
for the biweekly survey group. Column 1 uses round-9 data (with
the unit of observation being the child) and ﬁnds that reported
diarrhea is 7 percentage points lower in the more-frequently
measured biweekly group (vs. the low-frequency group). Column

Table 1. Impact of more-frequent surveys on chlorine use, diarrhea, and spring protection treatment effect stability in Kenya

Parameter
Surveyed more
frequently
Protected spring
Surveyed more
frequently × Protected
spring
Mean of dependent
variable
No. of observations

Child diarrhea
(self-report) in the
past week—survey
round 9 (1)

Child diarrhea
(self-report) in the
past week—
panel data (2)

Chlorine in home
drinking water
container—survey
round 9 (3)

Chlorine in home
drinking water container—
survey round 16 (4)

Child diarrhea
(self-report) in the
past week—panel
data (5)

−0.068* (0.022)

−0.149* (0.026)

0.150* (0.050)

0.053† (0.028)

−0.182* (0.033)
−0.104* (0.034)
0.135* (0.048)

0.081

0.140

0.164

0.068

0.140

713

4,296

293

309

4,296

Ordinary Least Squares estimates with Huber-White SEs in parentheses, clustered at the spring level. Speciﬁcations reported in columns 2 and 5 include
child ﬁxed effects, because the data used there are an unbalanced panel.
*Signiﬁcant at 1%.
†
Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Experiment 2: Hospitalization Insurance Take-Up in the Philippines.

This experiment examines the effect of being surveyed on the
later take-up of hospitalization insurance. The insurance provides coverage for inpatient care and loan obligations in the
event of vehicle or work-related accidents. Green Bank, a large
rural bank in the Philippines, sells the insurance as a voluntary
add-on product to its microloans (insurance add-ons are common in credit markets throughout the world). The decision to
take up the insurance was probably nontrivial for most subjects
(e.g., a typical premium is approximately 3% of monthly income). We measure take-up using administrative data from
Green Bank. Forty-six percent took up the insurance in the 9-mo
period after the baseline survey.

Experiment 3: Health Insurance Take-Up in the Philippines. This experiment examines the effect of being surveyed on the later takeup of PhilHealth, a government-sponsored health insurance product in the Philippines. Green Bank wholesales PhilHealth as
an add-on to its loan products, similar to the hospitalization insurance offered in experiment 2. The decision to take up PhilHealth was probably nontrivial for most clients. Premiums are

Table 2. Impact of baseline survey on hospitalization insurance take-up, and on price elasticity stability, in the Philippines

Parameter
Surveyed
Initial premium
assigned (0–10)
Surveyed × Premium
Mean of
dependent variable
No. of observations

Ever purchased product
offered subsequent to
treatment (1)

Ever purchased product
offered subsequent to
treatment (2)

Owned product 6–9 mo
after treatment (3)

Owned product 6–9 mo
after treatment (4)

0.051 (0.034)
−0.021* (0.004)

0.070 (0.067)
−0.018† (0.009)

0.010 (0.021)
−0.002 (0.003)

0.021 (0.041)
−0.000 (0.006)

0.462

−0.004 (0.010)
0.462

0.115

−0.002 (0.006)
0.115

1,463

1,463

1,463

1,463

Results estimated using two-stage least squares, with random assignment to survey status instrumenting for survey completion, and controls for randomization strata.
*Signiﬁcant at 1%.
†
Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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This experiment also measures the effect of being surveyed on
the estimate of a treatment effect of primary interest: the effect
of insurance pricing on take-up.
The sample for this experiment includes 1,463 individual liability borrowers, in good standing on their microenterprise loan
repayments, drawn from the Northern Mindanao and Caraga
regions in southern Philippines. Dataset S1 (panel 2) presents
some descriptive statistics. Sixty-two percent of subjects had some
sort of health insurance coverage at baseline, but only approximately 5% had the type of broad accident coverage offered by
the product studied here. We randomly assigned 80% of the
sample to get a baseline survey (94% of the assigned group completed a survey). The survey was administered by an independent
ﬁrm with no afﬁliation to Green Bank: the Research Institute for
Mindanao Culture at Xavier University. The survey team made
no mention of Green Bank or the possibility of follow-up visits
for additional surveys. The survey included hundreds of questions on individual and household demographics, health status,
family health history, risk-taking behaviors and preferences, and
time preferences. Six questions mentioned insurance (Dataset
S3). The survey did not ask about intent or likelihood of purchasing insurance.
After the baseline survey, Green Bank marketed the insurance
product door to door. Only 87% of the sample was reached for
marketing, but we include all 1,463 in our analysis. Marketers
reached clients who had been surveyed at a median time of 50
d after the survey (with a range of 9–143 d).
Table 2 presents our estimate of the effects of completing the
baseline survey (instrumented by the random assignment to
survey status) on subsequent insurance take-up. The point estimate on the “surveyed” variable in column 1 shows a 5 percentage point increase that is statistically insigniﬁcant (P = 0.14)
over the 9-mo window for which we have take-up data. Columns
2 and 4 examine whether being surveyed changes a parameter
estimate of interest: the price sensitivity of insurance purchase.
The primary purpose of the study was to measure (heterogeneity
in) price sensitivity, and Green Bank randomized the insurance
premium it offered clients to be between 0 and 10 pesos per
1,000 pesos of outstanding loan amount. We ﬁnd that subjects
are price sensitive on average (from the results on the “premium” variable) and that the survey does not affect price sensitivity (i.e., the point estimate on the “Surveyed × Premium”
interaction variable is insigniﬁcant). Column 3 shows a smaller
and still insigniﬁcant survey effect on whether subjects had insurance 6–9 mo after the survey was completed.

MEDICAL SCIENCES

2 adds data from rounds 16, 19, and four prior annual surveys and
ﬁnds an even larger effect. Column 2 (and column 5) adds child
ﬁxed effects as additional controls, because in these speciﬁcations
we have multiple observations per child and an unbalanced panel.
Column 3 shows that households in the biweekly survey group
were 15 percentage points more likely to use chlorine in round 9.
In the raw data (not controlling for month of interview) the difference is 16 percentage points (0.24, vs. 0.08 in the low frequency
group). Round-16 data were collected immediately after a 4-mo
suspension due to postelection violence after the December 2007
Kenyan election. Chlorine use fell in both groups, but column 4
shows that usage was 5 percentage points higher (P = 0.06) in the
biweekly survey group. This smaller treatment effect (compared
with round 9) is consistent with the hypothesis that a survey serves
as a reminder to chlorinate, with an effect that falls over time in
the absence of reminders.
Column 5 estimates the impact of being surveyed more frequently on stability of a key parameter estimate. We take our
speciﬁcation from column 2 and add variables for whether the
household’s nearest spring was protected (randomly, as part of the
evaluation described in ref. 23) and for the interaction between
spring protection and being surveyed at biweekly frequency. The
interaction term delivers an estimate of parameter instability.
The large, positive, and statistically signiﬁcant (P = 0.007) coefﬁcient estimate on the interaction term suggests that morefrequent surveying can indeed change estimates of how spring
protection affects child diarrhea. This result differs from ref. 7, in
which more frequent contact increases the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect of Gingko biloba on cognitive functioning among dementia patients but does not change the statistical
signiﬁcance of the Gingko effect. It may be the case that spring
protection and survey reminders are substitutes in producing
improved water quality; indeed, the spring protection effect is not
statistically signiﬁcant in the subsample of more-frequently surveyed households. Methodologically, analyzing the biweekly
households alone would lead to the erroneous conclusion that
source water quality improvement does not have a statistically
signiﬁcant effect on diarrhea.

Table 3. Impact of baseline survey on health insurance take-up
in the Philippines

Parameter
Surveyed
Mean of
dependent
variable
No. of
observations

Ever purchased
product offered
subsequent to
treatment (1)

Owned product
6–9 mo
after treatment
(2)

Owned product
15–18 mo
after treatment (3)

0.067* (0.033)
0.264

0.036† (0.022)
0.094

0.023 (0.021)
0.086

1,224

1,224

1,224

Results estimated using two-stage least squares, with random assignment
to survey status instrumenting for survey completion, and controls for randomization strata.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%.
†
Signiﬁcant at 10%.

1,200 pesos per year ($25), which is approximately 12% of the
median loan amount and 10.5% of median monthly income. We
measure take-up using PhilHealth administrative data. Twenty-six
percent of our sample signed up for PhilHealth in the 18-mo period after the baseline survey.
The sample for this experiment includes 1,224 individual liability borrowers, in good standing on their microenterprise loan
repayments, drawn from Mindanao and Leyte, Philippines (no
overlap with those in experiment 1). Dataset S1 (panel 3) presents some descriptive statistics. Note that only 25% of surveyed
households had any health insurance coverage at baseline. We
randomly assigned 80% of the sample to get a baseline survey
(87% of this group completed a survey).
The survey was administered by independent ﬁrms with no
afﬁliations to Green Bank: The Ofﬁce of Population Studies at
San Carlos University for Leyte, and Research Institute for
Mindanao Culture at Xavier University for Mindanao. The survey
teams made no mention of Green Bank or the possibility of follow-up visits for additional surveys. The survey included hundreds
of questions on individual and household demographics, health
status, family health history, risk-taking behaviors and preferences, and time preferences. Six questions mentioned insurance
(Dataset S4). The survey did not ask about intent or likelihood of
purchasing insurance. The only mention of PhilHealth was in the
menu of possible responses to the question: “Are you currently
covered by any of the following types of health insurance?”
After the baseline survey, Green Bank marketed PhilHealth
door to door. Only 73% of the targeted 1,224 borrowers were
reached for marketing, but we include all 1,224 in our analysis.
Table 3 shows effects of taking the baseline survey (instrumented by the random assignment to survey status) on subsequent
health insurance purchase. Those taking the survey are 6.7 points
(25%) more likely to take up the insurance (column 1). This effect
dissipates over time, as shown in columns 2 and 3, which analyze
insurance coverage 6–9 mo and 15–18 mo after the survey. These
ﬁndings, and the similar result in experiment 1, are similar to the
ﬁnding of Chandon et al. (19) but contrast with those of Dholakia
and Morwitz (15), whereby the effect ﬁrst increases and then
decreases over time. Whether these contrasting dynamics are due
to different methodologies, different subject populations/settings,
and/or different treatments is an important consideration for
future research.
Pooling the Insurance Results. Given the similarity between the two
insurance studies, we also pool their results. Table 4 shows that we
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant 5.8 percentage point (16%) increase
in take-up at any point after the survey. As indicated above, this
effect is driven by take-up in months immediately after the survey.
Column 2 shows the dissipation of this effect 6–9 mo after
the survey.
1824 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1000776108

Experiment 4: Microcredit Take-Up in Morocco. This experiment
examines the effect of completing a baseline survey on later takeup of group liability microcredit in rural Morocco. The loan
product is offered by Al Amana, the largest microﬁnance institution in Morocco. The decision to take up a microloan was
probably nontrivial for most households, because the median loan
size ($600) is large relative to annual household income. We
measure take-up using administrative data from Al Amana. Seventeen percent of households took up a loan at some point during
our 2-y sample period.
The sample frame includes all 1,099 households in seven small
villages that Al Amana was entering for the ﬁrst time. Dataset S1
(panel 4) presents some descriptive statistics.
We stratiﬁed the random assignment of the baseline survey to
target 100 households per village. Thus 60% of the 1,099
households were assigned to be surveyed. Nearly 100% of those
assigned to be surveyed were actually reached and completed
a survey. The survey was administered by an independent ﬁrm
with no afﬁliation to Al Amana: Team Maroc.
Surveys asked hundreds of questions on demographics, asset
ownership, consumption and income, activities of the households, and the use of and need for ﬁnancial services. Questions
on credit constituted approximately 15% of the survey, and we
list them in Dataset S5. The survey’s only mention of Al Amana
was in a list of 15 potential credit sources on one of the questions. The survey did not directly ask about intent or likelihood
of using credit, although one of the questions is effectively
a likelihood question, in hypothetical form: “If you could get
a credit of 3000 dhs, with installments of 400 dhs per month
during 9 months, would you take it?”
After the baseline survey, Al Amana marketed the products in
villages using group meetings, ﬂyers, and door-to-door visits. Al
Amana marketed every week or two for at least 1 y after entering
a village.
Table 5 shows that we do not ﬁnd any evidence that completing a baseline survey signiﬁcantly affects loan take-up or use,
over any horizon. The estimates are imprecise, however, and the
conﬁdence intervals include effects that are large relative to the
sample mean loan take-up rates.
Experiment 5: Microloan Renewal in India. This experiment examines the effect of being surveyed on later renewal of group liability microloans from SKS Microﬁnance, a large lender in rural
India. The loan renewal decision was probably nontrivial for
most households, because the median loan size was 20% of the
median household’s annual expenditure. SKS administrative
data show that 77% of households renewed a loan within our 2-y
sample period.
The sample frame includes 10,780 borrowers from 200 villages. Dataset S1 (panel 5) presents some descriptive statistics.
In each village, we set a target number of households to be
surveyed and then randomly assigned the order in which surveyors
attempted to survey households. This randomization was done at
the household level, with the constraint that someone from each
ﬁve-person loan group in the village must appear in the survey
Table 4. Impact of baseline survey on insurance take-up:
Pooling two samples from Table 3

Parameter
Surveyed
Mean of
dependent variable
No. of observations

Ever purchased product
offered subsequent to
treatment (1)

Owned product
6–9 mo after
treatment (2)

0.058* (0.024)
0.372

0.022 (0.015)
0.108

2,687

2,687

Results estimated using two-stage least squares, with random assignment
to survey status instrumenting for survey completion, and controls for randomization strata.
*Signiﬁcant at 5%.
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Table 5. Impact of baseline survey on microcredit take-up in
Morocco
Owned product
6–9 mo
after treatment
(2)

Owned product
15–18 mo
after treatment (3)

−0.009 (0.024)
0.166

−0.007 (0.024)
0.141

−0.024 (0.024)
0.162

1,099

1,099

1,099

Discussion
We analyze ﬁve ﬁeld experiments that randomize whether or how
often a household was surveyed and then track subsequent use of
a related product using data that do not rely on respondent selfreports. In the three health studies, we ﬁnd that being surveyed
increased product use. In the two studies on microloans, we do not
ﬁnd any effect of being surveyed on borrowing behavior. We also
ﬁnd some evidence, in one of the two studies with appropriate
data, that being surveyed more frequently generates heterogeneous selection into a behavior of interest and thereby biases the
parameter estimate that primarily motivated the data collection in
the ﬁrst place.
Methodologically, our results suggest that researchers should
rely on the use of unobtrusive data collection when possible and
consider the tradeoffs between potential biases introduced from
surveying and the beneﬁts from having baseline data to identify
heterogeneous treatment effects not possible to estimate without implementation of a baseline survey. In cases in which obtrusive data collection is essential (e.g., to collect data on certain
outcomes, as in our experiment 1), infrequent survey visits on
large samples may be preferable to smaller samples with higherfrequency data collection and equivalent statistical power.
Unpacking the cognitive and behavioral mechanisms behind
interview effects has implications for model speciﬁcation in
consumer choice and for the design of optimal policy, marketing,
and social marketing, as well as for survey methodology. Our
designs here are not rich enough to identify deﬁnitively different
cognitive mechanisms, but we offer some speculation that is informed by ﬁndings from related literatures.
The two largest related literatures on how surveys affect
behaviors—on mere measurement and self-prophecy effects—
point to potentially important roles for baseline attitudes toward,
and experience with, the subsequent behavior of interest in
“moderating” (producing heterogeneous) treatment effects (17,
24). In contrast, our results do not offer much support for the
hypothesis that variation in attitudes and experience produces
heterogeneous survey effects. In the one study in which we have
the relevant baseline measures (experiment 1), we do not ﬁnd
strong evidence that survey effects vary with several different
measures of baseline attitudes toward or experience with the
chlorine product or brand (Dataset S7). Less directly, we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant main survey effects in the insurance studies, for which
baseline attitudes may be uniformly indifferent (“insurance is
sold, not bought”) and for which baseline experience is probably
low (hospitalization insurance is a new product). We do not ﬁnd
effects in one setting in which baseline attitudes and experience
are plausibly both quite high (experiment 5, conducted on existing
microcredit customers in a setting with high renewal rates even in
the control group). Some question–behavior studies ﬁnd that
another factor—cognitive dissonance—plays a moderating role,
but that seems unlikely in our surveys because our treatments do
not ask respondents to state intentions or likelihoods.
So which cognitive mechanisms do underlie our results? In
experiment 1 it seems likely that each survey serves as a sort of
reminder to use WaterGuard; previous studies have shown that
both patients and clinicians respond to repeated reminders to en-

Results estimated using two-stage least squares, with random assignment
to survey order instrumenting for survey completion, and controls for randomization strata.

order (i.e., be chosen to be surveyed) before an additional
member of any group could appear in the order. Surveyors were
instructed to make several attempts to reach a household before
moving to the next household on the list and to continue surveying
in a village until the target number of completed surveys was
reached. In all, 41% of the 10,780 households completed a survey.
The surveys asked several hundred questions on demographics,
assets, income, expenditure, health, and credit. Questions on
credit constituted a small fraction of the survey (Dataset S6). The
survey did not ask about intent or likelihood of using credit.
Surveyors were hired and managed by the research team, independently of SKS. However, in this experiment there were
explicit connections between the surveys and the subsequent
product offer: SKS loan ofﬁcers and some clients introduced
surveyors to other clients, and all survey subjects were informed
that they had been selected to participate in the study because
they were members of SKS. SKS was also listed as a potential
source of credit in six of the survey questions.
After the baseline survey, most clients faced the decision of
whether to renew their loan within the next year (because most
clients had loans with a 50-wk maturity). We estimate the effect
of taking a baseline survey on subsequent loan renewal from SKS
by instrumenting for survey completion with the household’s
randomly assigned survey order. We deﬁne renewal as taking
a new loan within 10 wk of having paid off one’s previous loan
(results are not sensitive to alternative deﬁnitions).
Table 6 shows that we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant effects. Column 1 includes the full sample (and hence all renewals subsequent
to the time of survey completion). The point estimate on the effect
of the baseline survey is small and not signiﬁcant, and the conﬁdence intervals contain only small effects (a change of 3 percentage points or less, relative to the sample mean of 0.77).
Columns 2–4 estimate the survey effect in subsamples that account for the fact that, because of repayment schedules, not all
households were actually eligible to renew their loan immediately
after the survey. Column 2 includes only those with a loan coming
up for renewal within 2 mo of the survey ending in all villages. The
point estimate is again small and not signiﬁcant, and the upper
and lower bounds of the conﬁdence interval imply a small effect
(approximately a 7 percentage point change in renewal, relative to
a sample mean of 0.67). We ﬁnd similar results when expanding
Table 6. Impact of baseline survey on microcredit renewal in India

Parameter
Surveyed
Mean of dependent variable
No of observations

Ever renewed subsequent
to treatment (1)

Renewed, if eligible to
renew within 2 mo
of treatment (2)

Renewed, if eligible
6–9 mo subsequent
to treatment (3)

Renewed, if eligible
15–18 mo subsequent
to treatment (4)

−0.005 (0.013)
0.769
10,780

−0.004 (0.036)
0.674
1,944

−0.016 (0.025)
0.635
4,111

−0.006 (0.032)
0.712
3,116

Ordinary Least Squares estimates, with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses, randomly assigned surveys, and controls for randomization strata.
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Parameter

the sample to include those eligible to renew during other windows subsequent to the survey period (columns 3 and 4).

Much work remains. In the meantime, researchers might reconsider whether, how, and how much to survey their subjects.
There is a risk of asking.

gage in health-promoting behaviors (25). In experiments 2–5, we
speculate that our relatively subtle treatments (being surveyed
about topics related to the target behavior) work through nonconscious, low-effort cognition: there is evidence of this even
in the more directed questioning used in the mere measurement
effect literature (8, 26). If this automatic, “System I” processing
(27) is indeed important, then survey designers may have something to learn from the literatures on priming, persuasive advertising, and information provision, which ﬁnd that small changes in
stimuli can produce substantial and lasting (but not always uniform) effects on behavior (28–32). The economics literature on
limited attention also seems relevant; as noted at the outset, one
could model our survey effects as shocks that draw attention to
choice set elements that usually have relatively low salience. Insurance decisions (which bear on future contingencies) may be
farther from “top of mind” than borrowing decisions (which bear
on immediate needs or opportunities) and hence respond more to
the subtle attention prods (33).
Our ﬁndings raise several other questions for future research.
Do surveys work directly on attention per se or indirectly through
intent or goal formation (28, 29, 34, 35)? Do our results generalize to wealthier societies? Are nontargeted behaviors affected
as well? Is it more directly related or less directly related questions that drive survey effects on behavior (e.g., in our insurance
studies, is it questions on insurance coverage and/or questions on
health risks)? How can one use evidence on the magnitude and
nature of survey effects to remove bias from survey data (36, 37)?
Do longer lags between surveying and subsequent choices mitigate survey effects? Do less-obtrusive methods of measuring
outcomes of interest yield sufﬁciently precise estimates to be feasible (e.g., with a sufﬁciently large sample, could one estimate the
effects of spring protection using a single follow-up survey on
diarrhea incidence as an outcome)?
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Methods
In experiments 2–5, we estimate whether and how much subsequent
product take-up is inﬂuenced by the baseline survey using two-stage least
squares with the random assignment of survey frequency status as an instrument for survey completion. Instrumenting avoids any confounding
correlations between product take-up and survey completion by using only
the randomly engineered component of survey completion to identify the
effects of being surveyed on product take-up. It also rescales the results to
adjust for differences in survey completion rates, making the magnitudes
comparable across studies. We use completed surveys only in experiment
1, because everyone was assigned to a survey condition (more- vs. lessfrequent), and we only have outcome data (e.g., chlorine test results) on
those who completed a given survey. All regressions also control for any
conditions used to stratify the random assignments. For experiment 5, we
report results using a binary instrument that equals 1 if the household was
assigned a survey order below 40 (where, for example, a survey order of 1
means that we told surveyors to try that household ﬁrst). Results are robust
to other deﬁnitions and functional forms for the instrument(s).
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